

There are no translations available.

### Il modello di Deception di Donald C. Daniel e Katherine L. Herbig


“In order to understand the process of deception, it is necessary to differentiate the categories of actors typically found on both sides of the interaction. [...] The deceiver's side consists of decision-makers, planners, and implementers. Regardless of who had the inspiration, a deception does not begin until a decision-maker agrees to it. Wide-ranging strategic deceptions such as *Bodyguard* are cleared only by the highest authorities. Having many responsibilities, they are unable to devote much time to planning and implementation.

[...] The initial target of a military deception is usually a state's intelligence organization. It consists of channel monitors who seek out and collect information and analysts who coordinate and evaluate it. Gatekeepers within intelligence organizations and command staffs screen the information and analyses, and determine what is actually forwarded to civilian or military authorities – the ultimate deception targets. Presumably relying on information received, these leaders often make the strategic or tactical decisions which the deceivers sought to influence. It is the links between deceivers and targets which makes deception possible. Designated as 'channels' in Figure, their variety is unlimited. A channel could be a foreign newspaper monitored by the target, his reconnaissance satellites, electronic intercept systems, diplomats, or spies. Through these channels the deceiver transmits signals, planted clues or pieces of evidence, which it is hoped the target will shape into indicators of the deceiver's intent or capabilities. A signal may be a paragraph in a news article on the activities of a general, a reduction in the level of military radio traffic, or a photo of ships offloading cargo. Taken together, for example, these may indicate to a target that an expected amphibious attack will not soon occur since the general expected to lead it is away on other business, radio traffic is too sparse to indicate impending activity, and ships preparing to carry out an impending attack usually on-load rather than off-load goods. A deception expert has compared his task of formulating and transmitting signals to the work of a playwright.

Each devises a story and seeks to put it across to an audience by means of 'scenery, props, costumes, principals, extras, dialogue, and sound effects'. In order to have the story unfold in the intended manner, each must coordinate the timing, tempo, and content of his signals.,,

(Donald C. Daniel e Katherine L. Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception”, in John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*, London-New York, Routledge, 1982, pp. 159-161.)

# Daniel and Herbig's models of



Source: M. Bennet, E. Waltz, 2007; Daniel, Herbig, 1981.

//